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THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT .IN GERMANY:
SCOPE OF ITS JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE*
Hans G. Rupp"
I. Introduction
In its Constitution of 1949 the Federal Republic of Germany has chosen
to establish a novel type of tribunal for the adjudication of constitutional issues.
Previously, similar courts had been established only in Austria (1920) and in
Italy (1946). The German Federal Constitutional Court, although not an appellate court, takes precedence over all other courts1 in the judicial hierarchy.
It is the highest tribunal in Germany, being entrusted with the adjudication of
all (justiciable) constitutional issues.
The jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court is not limited to judicial review of legislative acts and of executive and judicial actions in the narrow sense.
It is also the sole arbiter of disputes between the federal executive and legislative
departments concerning their respective powers under the Constitution. Consider
Congress having standing in the Supreme Court to institute proceedings against
the President of the United States by which that Court could declare that he had
encroached on the powers of the legislative branch of the government by his
executive order seizing the steel industry.2 Imagine also the Senate appearing in
court and arguing that the President, in violation of the United States Constitution, had not secured the Senate's assent to the removal of a presidential appointee.' Moreover, in the German federal state disputes may arise between the
federal government and the state governments over the division of powers between
them under the German Constitution. Similar disputes may arise between two
or more states. All these types of disputes too may be brought before the Federal
Constitutional Court.
From these preliminary observations it appears that the scope of the jurisdiction of the Federal Constitutional Court over constitutional issues is larger than
that of the Supreme Court of the United States. The United States Supreme
Court, for example, would certainly label most disputes between the legislative
and executive departments concerning their respective powers as "political questions" and would refuse to assume jurisdiction.
Another difference stems from procedure. In the United States the constitutional question is simply an incidental issue in a criminal case or a civil suit
in a court of law. This is so, because the constitutional grant of judicial power
* This article is based on a lecture delivered at the University of Notre Dame on October
16, 1968 under the joint sponsorship of the Law School and the Committee on International
Relations.
** Dr. jur., University of Berlin, 1933; Associate Justice, Federal Constitutional Court of
the Federal Republic of Germany, 1951; Honorary Professor of Law, University of Tiibingen,
1955.
1 For a brief exposition of the other German courts, both state and federal, see Rupp,
ludicial Review in the Federal Republic of Germany, 9 AM. J. ComP. L. 29, 29-30 (1960).
2 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
3 See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
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limits the jurisdictiqn of the Supreme C6Vrt to "cases" and "controversies'";4
these terms designate claims or contentions of litigants brought before the courts
for adjudication by regular proceedings. The Federal Constitutional Court also
decides "cases" and "controversies" between "litigants," but in a special proceeding and as a court of first and last resort. The constitutional-issue is not 'an

incidental point but the main theme. The litigants are state governments, the
federal government, the executive and legislative departments in the federal
government, or an individual citizen attacking the final judgment of a court of
law for violation of basic rights as guaranteed in the German Bill of Rights.
Similar to the United States Supreme Court the Federal Constitutional Court
is a constitutional court also in the sense that to abolish it would require constitutional amendment. Furthermore, the Constitution determines the scope of
its jurisdiction, which can be extended but -not reduced by statute. The Court's
interpretation of the Constitution is final and binding on all other courts and
on all departments of government.
The Court is organized into two panels - called 'Senates - of eight judges
each, the jurisdiction, of each panel (within the scope of the Constitutional
grant) being determined by statute. The -judges are elected by the, legislature.
Three judges in each panel are elected for life, while the remaining five -are
elected for only eight years. Reelection is possible. for the latter group., (A bill
which is about to. be introduced in the federal legislature provides election of
all judges for twelve years with possible reelection until retirement age. Compulsory retirement for all judges would be set at age sixty-eight.)
II. Recent Cases Illustrating the Jurisdiction and Procedure
of the Federal Constitutional Court
Additional aspects of the jurisdiction and procedure of the Constitutional
Court, as well as those mentioned above, may now be illustrated by some cases
decided by the Court in recent years. It:is hoped -thatthis approach willbe more
interesting than a mere exposition of rules and requirements. Also, by exdmining
its jurisdiction and procedure through recent cases, the reader can acquire a
feel for some of the substantive issues regularly handled by the Constitutional
Court.
The so-called Television Case,' decided in 1961 by the-Second Senate, has
been much publicized because it checkmated the endeavors of the federal government to gain control over television programs. Before 1933 the technical
equipment of radio stations in Germany was provided by the Federal Post Office
,4

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 provides in part:

The judicial power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this

Constitution, the Laws -of the United'States, and Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under their Authority; - to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls; - to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; - to
Controversies to which the United States 'shall be a Party; - to Controveksies between two or more States; - between a State and Citizens of another State;
between Citizens of different States, - between Citizens of the same State claiming
Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof,
and foreign States, Citizens and Subjects. [Emphasis added.]
5 'Judgment of'February 28, 1961, 12 BVerfG 205.
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Department. The programming itself was in the hands of private corporations,
in which the Post Office Department acquired a controlling interest. Nevertheless, government control of radio programs was at that time rather restrained.
Between 1933 and 1945, however, radio was 100% government-controlled:
After World War II all radio stations were taken over by the occupation powers,
who later turned them over to public corporations which were given charters by
the legislatures of the German states or by compacts concluded between these
states. These corporations had to observe certain regulations laid down by the
occupation authorities, which had the purpose of safeguarding the absolute political neutrality of the programs and assuring complete freedom from government
influence on program policy, business and organizational affairs. In order to
secure strict adherence to these regulations, the governing bodies of the corporations consisted of representatives of all walks of life, including representatives of
all political parties, of all sectors of cultural life, of all religious denominations,
trade unions, and women's and youth organizations. Nine such public corporations have been established to serve the whole area of the Federal Republic.
Since television came to Germany, these corporations have also taken up the
transmission of two nationwide daily television programs and several regional
shows.
Television is one of the most effective mass media for direct or indirect political propaganda. Therefore, in 1960 the federal government under Chancellor
Adenauer tried to lay its hands directly on television inasmuch as the existing
radio and television corporations, due to their pledge of political neutrality,
seemed inept instruments to carry forward government propaganda. To achieve
its aim the federal government created a private corporation called DeutschlandFernsehen-GmbH, reserving for itself the controlling interest therein and offering the rest of the shares to the eleven German states. To the grief of the
Chancellor the states not only refused his offer of shares in the corporation, but
several of them brought suit against the federal government in the Constitutional
Court, stating that their rights under articles 30 and 5 of the Constitution of the
Federal Republic (Grundgesetz) had been violated by its establishment.
Article 30 provides that the exercise of governmental powers and the discharge of governmental functions is within the jurisdiction of the states unless
the Constitution provides otherwise. Thus article 30 has the same meaning as
the tenth amendment of the United States Constitution and embodies the same
basic principle for the distribution of powers between state and federal governments. Article 5 is one of the most important provisions of the German Bill of
Rights. It guarantees freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of radio
and the right of every individual to information from generally accessible sources.
The federal government, in its arguments before the Constitutional Court,
contended that the establishment of the corporation was constitutional under
article 73 which accords the federation the exclusive power to legislate on postal
and telecommunication matters. But the Court decided in favor of the complaining states and against the federal government. It held that the federal government, by establishing the Deutschland-Fernsehen-GmbH, had violated articles
30 and 5 as well as the principle of federal comity. The power to legislate on
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postal and telecommunication matters, the Court said, according to the wording,
history and purpose of the asserted provision, encompassed only the technical
requirements of radio and television stations. Thus, the federal government,
acting through the Post Office Department, could only erect transmitters and
install the necessary electronic equipment in the stations as it did before, but had
to lease those installations to public corporations modeled after the existing ones.
It had no power to interfere with the organization of those bodies or influence
the programs to be broadcast. Since the latter power had been the only point of
interest for the federal government's action, its defeat was complete. As to the
violation of article 5, the Court pointed out that in order to safeguard the
freedom of these modem instruments for influencing public opinion, control
of radio and television must not be relinquished to the government or to
one single group in society. The management of radio and television transmission must be organized in such a manner as to provide a voice for all important
segments of society; the programs to be transmitted should be unbiased and give
due space to a variety of viewpoints. These requirements were fully met by the
present setup of the several public corporations in charge of radio and television.
Thus federalism, in the European sense, had won a battle before the Constitutional Court for the freedom of radio and television from government interference. The Court's decision has saved the German citizen from the monotonous
blare and glare of state controlled television.
The so-called Spiegel case also deals with the freedom of press and information. It was decided by the First Senate in 1966.
In October, 1962 the news magazine Der Spiegel - in importance and
circulation comparable to Time and Newsweek - published an unsigned article,
"Bedingt abwehrbereit" ("Limited Preparedness for Defense"). It drew conclusions from the results of the NATO war games, "Fallex 1962," which had
taken place some weeks before, and stated that the German Bundeswehr was
prepared for effective defense only on a limited scale. The article criticized the
equipping of the Bundeswehr with atomic weapons, and disclosed particulars
on Operation Fallex and on the military planning within NATO in general.
It even published photographs of new weapons.
The chief federal prosecutor subsequently instituted proceedings against the
publisher and several editors, seeking to try them for treason before the Federal
Court of Criminal Appeals. Section 99, paragraph 2 and section 100, paragraph 1 of the German Criminal Code had at the time provided that whoever
intentionally disclosed publicly an official secret and thereby endangered the
welfare of the Federal Republic would be punished for treason. The prosecution
stated that the military details disclosed in the article were classified material and
therefore to be considered official secrets. The prosecutor procured judicial warrants for the search of the Spiegel publishing offices at Hamburg, for the seizure
of any material connected with the article, and for the arrest of publisher Augstein
and editor Ahlers. The search of the publishing offices, which occupied 117
rooms in a seven story building, lasted an entire month and was executed at
times by as many as seven federal prosecutors supported by fifty police officers.
6

Judgment of August 5, 1966. 20 BVerfG 162.
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The first setback for the prosecution came in May, -1965, when the Federal
Court of Criminal Appeals threw out the indictment against Augstein and Ahlers
for lack of sufficient evidence. The immediate result of the search and seizure
action had been an enormous rise in the circulation. of Spiegel magazine, an
event certainly not envisioned and even less cherished by the prosecution. In the
meantime, the Spiegel Publishing Company had filed a constitutional complaint
with the Constitutional Court against the criminal court allowing the search
and seizure. The constitutional complaint (Verfassungsbeschwerde) is a remedy
accorded to the individual to bring his grievances before the Court. Any person
(or private corporation, insofar as the Bill of Rights is applicable to it) may
petition the Court directly to declare a federal or state statute unconstitutional
and void, to set aside an executive act, or to reverse the decision of any other
court on the ground that it violates a right guaranteed to him in the Bill of
Rights.' Before filing the complaint, however, the complainant must have exhausted other available judicial remedies. The latter requirement was met in the
Spiegel case after the Federal Court of Criminal Appeals had upheld the warrants. The complaining Spiegel Publishing Company stated that the warrants
had violated its right of freedom of the press as guaranteed by article 5 of the
Constitution. It further contended that that provision prohibited- all actions
by the state which had the purpose of obtaining knowledge about the sources
of information on which the magazine article was based. The Company argued
that the indictment against the publisher and the editor for alleged treason was
only a subterfuge to secure the search and seizure warrants, and thus to discover
possible leaks in the Defense Ministry through which the information supposedly
passed to Der Spiegel. "
The Constitutional Court dismissed the Spiegel Company's complaint as unfounded. It conceded that search and seizure with the purpose only to detect
leads to the persons who had given the editor information for the article would
have been illegal, but found that there was insufficient evidence to support such
a conclusion. Moreover, the Court felt that the constitutional guaranty of freedom of the press did not include an absolute prohibition of search and seizure
of editorial offices. The press could claim no special privilege in criminal proceedings; they had to submit to inquiries just the same as the ordinary citizen who
was suspected to have committed a crime. But, the Court said, the constitutional
guaranty of freedom of the press made it imperative that both prosecutor and
court weigh very carefully the measures intended and avoid any course which
would cause unnecessary hardship and restraint on editorial and publishing
work. There was, however, again no proof that the authorities in question had
overlooked these limitations.
The Spiegel decision is not only important for the discussion and solution
of the conflict between the constitutional concept of freedom of the press and
the necessity to protect the state against treasonable activities, but also for the
fact that in handing down the decision the Court was evenly divided, and for
the first time since the Court was established, the division was disclosed. Al7 GRUNDGESETZ arts. 1-17. Hereinafter the Grundgesetz, the German Federal Constitution, is cited as GG.
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though.the Court did not announce the names of the four judges on either side,
each group was allowed to give its reasons within the framework of the Court's
opinion.' This event may be considered as the first step towards a published
dissenting opinion, which today is not in practice in Gernany. After this case,
however, the Second Senate of the Constitutional Court took a further step by
announcing the votes in every case but without giving the names of the judges
of the majority and minority.
Although the complaint was dismissed and the government had won its
case, the news about the reason for its success - the equality of votes - came
as a profound'but healthy shock. The criminal proceeding against Der Spiegel
had, from the outset, raised misgivings and discussion in the press and among
the general public. Nowv the government noticed with horror that it had had only
a very narrow escape in the Constitutional Court.
A second result of the decision was that the equal division of votes dramatized the inadequacy of the provisions of the German Criminal Code on treason,
in that they failed to sufficiently distinguish between the felon who committed
treason by disclosing military secrets directly to foreign military intelligence, for
financial gain and the responsible editor who did it in. order to inform the
general public of his country of weak spots in the defense setup. This gap was
closed in June, 1968, when, the treason provisions of the Criminal Code were
amended. Section 94 (replacing former sections 99, paragraph 2 and 100, paragraph 1) now provides that whoever causes an official secret to be delivered to an
unauthorized person or makes such a secret public with the intent to injure the
Federal Republic or to aid and abet a foreign country, and, who thereby brings
about the danger of gross detriment to the external security of the Republic, shall
be punished for treason. As may be easily perceived, the new wording makes a
difference between the felon and, the publisher or editor. In most cases it will be
impossible to prove that a responsible editor had disclosed official secrets with
the intent to injure the Federal Republic or to aid and abet a foreign country.
Under another procedural device, abstrakte Normenkontrolle, the federal
government, a state government, or one-third of the membership of the Bundestag
may petition the Constitutional Court to declare a federal or state statute unconstitutional or void. Obviously unlike anything in United States constitutional
law procedure,9 this entrer into the Court is illustrated by recent attempts to have
the federal government subsidize political parties.
Political parties play a very important part in a democratic state, especially
with regard to elections. The Federal Republic of Germany is the only nation
8 The reason why the complaint, with four judges in its favor and'four against it, had
to be dismissed is found'in section 15, paragraph 2 of the statute governing the procedure
of the Constitutional Court. This, section restrains the Court from holding that the Constitution has been violated in a specific case if the number of votes for and against are equal.
9 In the United States the federal courts cannot decide constitutional questions in the
abstract.
. . . [Tjhe limitation to "case or controversy" is intimately related to the doctrine
of judicial review. In Marbury v. Madison it was central to Marshall's argument
that a court has power; to declare a statute unconstitutional only as a consequence
of the power of the court to decide cases properly before it. Unconstitutional
statutes there may be, but unless they are involved in a case properly susceptible of
judicial determination, the courts have no power to pronounce that they are unconstitutional. [Footnote omitted.] C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL CouRTs 32-33 (1963).
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that expressly mentions, in a special article of the Constitution, the role of political parties:
(1) The political parties participate in the forming of the political will of
the people. They may be freely formed. Their internal organization
must conform to democratic principles. They must publicly account
for the sources of their funds.
(2) Parties which, by reason of their aims or the behavior of their adherents, seek to impair or destroy the free democratic basic order or
to endanger the existence of the Federal Republic of Germany are unconstitutional. The Constitutional Court decides on the question of
unconstitutionality.

(3) Details will be regulated by federal legislation.'
It is common knowledge among members of political parties in all democratic countries that the daily upkeep of a party organization, and even more so
an election campaign, cost money - lots of money. The usual way to get it is to
solicit pledges of financial support from party members, individual voters, business corporations or professional organizations such as labor unions, Chambers
of Commerce and the like. This method of financing political parties has two
flaws. First, it makes the parties dependent upon their financial sponsors. Second,
the flow of money is restrained by the fact that in most countries the sponsor
has to pay income tax on his gift. What, then, is more natural for the parties
than trying to change income tax legislation in their favor?
Exactly this was done by the German Bundestag in 1954, when, with the
votes of the Christian Democratic Union and the Free Democratic Party, it
passed an amendment to the income tax laws providing that individual taxpayers could deduct up to ten percent and corporations up to five percent from
their taxable income if they gave such money to a political party. In 1957 the
socialist state government of Hesse filed a petition in the Constitutional Court
to have the statute declared unconstitutional on the ground that it transgressed
the constitutional mandate that all parties must have an equal chance in an
election. The statutory provision allowing the taxpayer to deduct gifts to political
parties from his taxable income, though applicable to gifts to the Social Democratic Party as well as to the Christian Democratic Union and Free Democratic
Party, actually favored - so the government of Hesse said - gifts to the latter
two, because individuals and corporations with big incomes would hardly subsidize a socialist party but would rather give their money to a party representing
their own interests such as the Christian Democratic Union and Free Democratic
Party. The Court followed the reasoning of petitioner and declared the statute
void. 1 The procedural avenue followed by Hesse in this case was abstrakte
Normenkontrolle.
This decision, of course, came as a severe blow to the treasurers of the
political parties. They had, therefore, to try some other device to replenish
their empty coffers. Beginning with the Appropriation Act of 1959, the
Bundestag provided an appropriation of five million DM a year for the parties
10 GG art. 21.
11 Judgment of June 24, 1958, 8 BVerfG 51.

[Vol. 44:548]

FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT IN GERMANY

555

represented in the Bundestag. This sum was to be distributed in proportion to
the number of their seats in the Bundestag. In 1962, the appropriation was
raised to twenty million and in 1964 to thirty-eight million DM. Again, in 1965,
the government of Hesse petitioned the Court to declare unconstitutional and
void the provisions of the Appropriation Act of 1965 which also allotted thirtyeight million DM to the parties represented in the Bundestag. Hesse argued that
subsidies paid out of the federal treasury to political parties made them dependent
on the federal government, which was under no legal obligation to distribute the
appropriated funds, but which rather had authority to do so subject to its own
discretion. More specifically, the parties were dependent on the actual majority
in the Bundestag, which might slash the appropriation in any forthcoming fiscal
year. This, the government of Hesse argued, was contrary to article 21 of the
Constitution of the Federal Republic, which required political parties to remain
completely free from government influence.
The Court handed down its decision in July, 1966,12 declaring the contested
provisions of the Appropriation Act of 1965 unconstitutional and void. It acceded to the arguments of Hesse to the extent that it held that political parties,
which had to participate in the free and open process of the formation of the
will of the people, must not be influenced in this activity by state organs which
themselves were created by the will of the people in elections. Therefore, an
appropriation for the purpose of covering running expenses of the party organization was unconstitutional. But, the Court continued, since in a democracy the
state organs were created by general elections which could not be held without
the cooperation of the political parties in proposing candidates for elective offices, it was constitutional if a statute provided that the parties should be reimbursed out of the federal treasury for their financial outlay on election campaigns. The Court made this reimbursement subject to several conditions:
(1) Only such costs may be reimbursed which are actual and direct campaign
costs.
(2) The outlay must have been necessary to carry on an adequate and fair
campaign.
(3) The constitutional principle of equal chances requires that all parties
which participated in the elections get their share - not only those
represented in the Bundestag - notwithstanding
that small splinter groups
13
could be excluded from reimbursement.
A year later the Bundestag passed the Political Parties Act (Parteiengesetz),
enabled by article 21, in order to define which associations were to be given
the status of a political party, how they should be organized, and how they
should publicly account for the sources of their funds. This statute had long
been overdue, especially since some parties had shied away from making any
move in the direction of public accounting and disclosure of their sponsors.
Now that the Bundestag was going to pass a statute on this subject the eagerness
12
13

Judgment of July 19, 1966, 20 BVerfG 56.
Id. at 112-19.
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to reimburse their respective parties for election expenses obviously had given
wings to the legislators.
The Political Parties Act of 1967 provides that the government provide a
lump sum of 2.5 DM for every citizen authorized to vote (but not necessarily
actually voting), to be distributed among all parties which have participated
in an election according to the number of votes cast for them, provided that they
have received at least two and one-half percent of the total vote.
Shortly after the Political Parties Act had come into force, several small
parties which had not gained the required two and one-half percent of the total
vote in the last election attacked the new statute as unconstitutional, particularly
on the ground that the requirement of at least two and one-half percent of
the total vote violated the principle of equal chances.' The Court, in an opinion
handed down on December 3, 1968, declared that requiring at least two and
one-half percent of the total vote as a condition for the plaintiffs to have their
election costs reimbursed indeed violated their right of equal chances in an election; however, it held that a requirement of one-half percent of the total vote
would still be tolerable under the constitution. 5
From the cases mentioned above, one might gain the impression that the
Federal Constitutional Court is preoccupied with cases concerning the conduct
of public affairs and having far-reaching political implications, and that it has
no time and no heart for the daily grievances of the man in the street. Nothing
could be farther from the truth. As a matter of fact, the Court's daily fare consists of the troubles of the man in the street and they, too, arrive by way of
various procedural avenues.
One of the basic provisions in our Bill of Rights is the right of individual
liberty and the right to the inviolability of the person. A man was tried for a
minor fraud in municipal court."7 Before witnesses were called, his counsel moved
that he should be medically examined to determine whether he was fully responsible for his actions. A medical expert, upon examination of the defendant,
said that without electroencephalography and pneumoencephalography (pumping air into the cerebral ventricle) it was impossible to decide whether he was
fully responsible or not, because a brain injury sustained earlier could be a decisive factor. Thereupon the court ordered the defendant to be examined in a
hospital and gave permission to subject him, even against his'will, to pneumoencephalography and electroencephalography. On appeal, the order was upheld.
Subsequently, the defendant, through counsel, filed a constitutional complaint
with the Constitutional Court asking a reversal of the order because it infringed
upon his fundamental right to the inviolability of his person.
The Constitutional Court reversed the order insofar as it had permitted
pneumoencephalography. This, the Court held, would be a considerable encroachment on the defendant's right to the inviolability of his person inasmuch
14 Political parties have standing to bring suit in the Federal Constitutional Court to
protect their constitutional rights, since they have been officially recognized by the Constitution as participating in the formation of the political will of the people. GO art. 21, § 1; cf.
Judgment of July 20, 1954, 4 BVerfG 27. See also Rupp, supra note 1, at 43.
15 This opinion will be published in volume 24 of the BVerfG.
16 GG art. 2, § 2.
17 Judgment of July 25, 1963, 17 BVerfG 108.
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as such an operation might result in great pain and eventually in a dangerous
infection. Such an invasion into the protected personal sphere should be commensurate to the criminal act which the defendant was suspected to have committed. The case against this defendant was based on very shaky evidence.
In these circumstances, pneumoencephalography could not be justified as a
means to determine whether the defendant was fully responsible'
Another case concerning the fundamental right of personal liberty arose in
connection with sections 72, 73 and 74 of the Federal Social Welfare Act
(Bundessozialhilfegesetz) of 1962 which provided that even a financially selfsupporting person could, by court order, be detained in an adequate institution
if he
(1) had an extremely weak willpower or could not restiain his carnal instincts, and
(2) was unkempt or depraved, and
(3) could be reformed only 'n a closed institution.
The purpose of the detention-as expressed in the statute was to bring the individual back into the social fold and get him accustomed to regular work.
The question of whether these rather ambiguously worded provisions
violated individual liberty came before the Constitutional Court in a proceeding
abstrakte Normenkontrolle instituted by the state government of Hesse.1 9 The
Court declared the provisions, which according to their wording were applicable
to prostitutes as well as they would have been to famous poets or painters of the
past like Heinrich Heine and Toulouse-Lautrec, unconstitutional and void. The
purpose of the provisions, the Court said, was neither to protect the community
nor 'the individual in question himself, because the persons contemplated by
the statute were neither criminal nor insane. The provisions of the statute were
designed rather to "reform" people who had committed no wrong more serious
than dressing sloppily, smelling badly, being dirty and living an eccentric life.
The Court held that it was not the state's business to20"reform" its citizens and
that article 2 protected them against such endeavors.
The Constitution of 1949 has left unimpaired the power" of the courts to
review statutes, a power which they had usurped in the days of the Weimar
Republic after World War .21 But it allows them to render judgment forthwith
only if they conclude that the statute to be applied in the case at bar is constitutional. Only then do they exercise the "case or controversy" type of incidental
judicial review of legislation evident in the American pattern. 22 By express constitutional command, however, every German court, high or low, is required to
stay proceedings and to refer the question'of the constitutionality of the statute
to the Constitutional Court if it deems the statute repugnant to the Constitution."
18
19
20
21
22
23

Id.
Judgment of July 18, 1967, 22 BVerfG 180.
Id.
Rupp, supra note 1, at 31-32.
See note 9 supra.
GG art. 100, § 1.

,
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The Constitutional Court receives the whole record, but does not review the case
on its merits. It does not decide whether John Doe may recover in tort from
Richard Roe or whether a defendant is guilty of a crime. It decides only whether
the statute which the lower court deems invalid is constitutional or not. After
the decision of the Constitutional Court (which is final and binding on all
courts and government agencies) has been handed down, the court which had
certified the question to the Constitutional Court, and before which the case is
pending, resumes proceedings and renders judgment (konkrete Normenkontrolle) .24

One recent case illustrating this type of proceeding concerned the constitutionality of certain provisions in the law of adoption, and was decided by
the First Senate on July 29, 1968.25 Section 1747 of the German Civil Code,
as amended, provides that the consent of the parents (or, if the child is illegitimate, of the mother) to the adoption of a child under twenty-one years
of age may be replaced by a decree of the Juvenile (Orphans) Court if the
parents have continually and gravely neglected their duties to the child, if withholding consent is deemed to be malicious, and if the child would be seriously
handicapped should the adoption not take place. Similar provisions can be
found in the law of Anglo-American countries. On the other hand, according
to article 6 of the Constitution, marriage and family enjoy the special protection
of the state. The care and upbringing of children are at once both the natural
right of the parents and a duty primarily incumbent on them. The state watches
over the performance of this duty. Separation of children from the family against
the will of the persons entitled to bring them up may take place only pursuant
to law, if those so entitled fail in their duty or if the children are otherwise
threatened with neglect.
Several courts that had to pass upon petitions for decrees to replace the
maliciously withheld parental consent to adoption had come to the conclusion
that the above mentioned section of the Civil Code violated the constitutional
principles which recognized the natural right of parents to care for and bring
up their children. This natural right, in the opinion of those courts, was infringed upon in its essential content if the child, without parental consent, could
be irrevocably transferred to another family. The Constitutional Court nevertheless declared section 1747 constitutional because it enabled the state to fulfill
its constitutional duty to watch over the performance of the parents in caring
for their children. If the natural parents neglected their duty, the state, for
the sake of the welfare of the child, could step in and, by judicial decree, replace the consent withheld by the parents. "
III. Conclusion
It has been stated quite recently that the Supreme Court of the United
States is both a judicial tribunal and a political organ of state.' The same holds
24
25
26
27

Rupp, supra note 1, at 32.
Judgment of July 29, 1968, 24 BVerfG 119.
Id.
Kauper, The Supreme Court: Hybrid Organ of State, 21 Sw. L.J. 573, 578 (1967).
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true for the German Constitutional Court, because it, too, performs a function
which transcends that of the ordinary judicial tribunals. It deals with matters
of large political significance - political both in the sense that the Court's work
requires it to pass judgment on the other organs of Government, and in the
sense that policy considerations necessarily play a large part in the process of
constitutional interpretation.
In order to remain "the least dangerous branch" of government, such a
court must adhere to two principles. The one is judicial self-restraint. The other,
occasioned by the far-reaching binding force of its decisions which compels
obedience by the other departments of government, the other courts, and the
individual citizen, is a certain continuity in its interpretation of the Constitution
and an absence of vacillation in its adjudications. On the other hand, the Constitutional Court must also be aware that almost all issues it is called upon to
decide have some political coloring and, in a broad sense, concern "political
questions." One of the purposes of the Constitutional Court is to insure that
the business of government is conducted with due respect for the law. If it
shrinks from this responsibility because a case is politically controversial, it will
lose an opportunity to demonstrate to the people and the other governmental
departments that ours is an ordered government of law.2"
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